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Abstract: The St. Petersburg Paradox is one of the oldest challenges of expected value theory. 
Thus far, explanations of the paradox aim at small probabilities being perceived as zero and the 
boundedness of utility of the outcome. This paper provides experimental results showing that 
neither diminishing marginal utility of the outcome nor perception of small probabilities can 
explain the paradox. We find that even in situations where subjects are risk-seeking, and zeroing-
out small probabilities supports risk-taking, the St. Petersburg Paradox exists. This indicates 
that the paradox cannot be resolved by the arguments advanced to date.  
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1 Introduction 
The extent to which generations of researchers raise a certain issue is an indicator of its importance. 
One issue that researchers have repeatedly debated is a unified explanation for play of the St. 
Petersburg game, a paradox that has attracted researchers’ interest for 300 years (Neugebauer 2010; 
Seidl 2013). In the original version of the St. Petersburg Game, a fair coin is tossed until it comes up 
heads for the first time. The game pays 2n with n indicating the number of tosses it takes for the first 
occurrence of heads. While the St. Petersburg game in its original version offers an infinite expected 
value, people are found to pay no  more than $25 for hypothetical offers to participate in the game, 
which may be regarded as irrational decision making (Hacking 1980).  
The paradox unfolds an immense importance in many diverse fields such as statistical decision 
analysis (Seidl 2013), econophysics (Takayasu 2010), business ethics (Shrader-Frechette 1985), 
economics (Rieger and Wang 2006; Samuelson 1960), psychology (Mishra 2014; Chechile and Barch 
2013), and even evolutionary theory (Real 1980), in particular animals’ foraging decisions studied in 
zoology (Real 1996). In the business research context, researchers routinely refer to the paradox 
when discussing and analyzing, for example, crashes of high-tech stocks (Székely and Richards 
2004) and more generally the extent to which speculator psychology has attained an irrational bent at 
stock markets (Durand 1957), optimal contracting decisions (Mookherjee and Png 1989), optimal 
portfolio strategies (Rubinstein 2002), newsvendor order decisions (Wang, et al. 2009), and loss-
aversion in consumer behavior (Camerer 2005). 
Against this background, modeling play of the St. Petersburg game is essential in many fields. 
Although several explanations are proposed as solutions to this paradox, there is no general 
agreement on a unified model valid for different versions of the paradox. This article adds another 
layer of complexity to the topic, in that we present experimental evidence that shows similar play in 
finite St. Petersburg games with conventional positive prizes (2n) and negative prizes (-2n), as 
monetary payments but also in waiting time. These results are not compatible with loss aversion. Our 
data suggest that St. Petersburg games elicit similar choices that are invariant to the sign of prizes. As 
such, we hope our results will contribute to the ongoing discussion of the topic by providing new 
evidence on decisions about play of St. Petersburg games when prizes are negative, an issue that has 
been overlooked in the literature.  
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2 Literature Review and Experiment Overview 
Various researchers have provided explanations for the St. Petersburg Paradox (e.g., Seidl 2013; 
Rieger and Wang 2006; Blavatskyy 2005), but with every explanation a new version of the initial 
game was constructed that brought back the puzzle (Samuelson 1977). Versions of the game have 
been constructed that challenge all currently-popular theories of decision under risk (Cox and Sadiraj 
2009). 
Historically, the first explanation for the observed behavior was decreasing marginal utility of 
the outcome (Bernoulli 1738/1954). However, for unbounded utilities, games can be constructed 
with prizes correcting for decreasing marginal utility and the paradox remains.1 
Therefore, the focus shifted towards the credibility of “infinity” (i.e., no bounds on potential 
prizes, or on the number of coin flips). Limited time was introduced to bound the value of the St. 
Petersburg game (Brito 1975; Cowen and High 1988). In contrast, it was argued that the value of the 
lottery could in principle be unbounded but the offer to play the game is most probably not 
considered to be credible (Shapley 1977), explaining the decision patterns found in experimental 
studies. The most favored solution of the paradox, however, is that utility is bounded since otherwise 
one can always create lotteries leading to counterintuitive solutions (Aumann 1977). But bounding 
utility substitutes one paradox for another: with bounded utility, an agent will exhibit implausible 
large-stakes risk aversion (Cox and Sadiraj 2009). 
To avoid infinity, the St. Petersburg Game was broken down into a series of finite games, but 
the paradox does not disappear (Samuelson 1960), questioning infinity as the underlying cause of 
the paradox. Other work argues that perception of small probabilities of large payoffs is the source 
of the paradox since sufficiently small probabilities are regarded as zero (Brito 1975) or small 
chances for large prizes create big risks for the agents (Allais 1952; Weirich 1984) who are willing 
to buy the game at a large price. In another approach on using probabilities as an explanation for the 
phenomenon, more recent work introduced a new weighting function for cumulative prospect 
theory, attempting to solve the problem of infinity (Blavatskyy 2005). 
Experimental research has turned to a modified version of the question originally posed by 
Bernoulli: Is human choice behaviour in St. Petersburg lotteries consistent with expected value 
theory in finite versions of the game that involve few coin tosses, n? Initial experiments followed the 
general idea that financial incentives provide subjects with an economic motivation for truthfully 
revealing ranking of available options (Camerer and Hogarth 1999). Thus, experiments based on 
                                                 
1 For log utility, replace payoffs 2n with payoffs exp(2n) and the paradox returns. More generally, for an unbounded utility, 
u replace payoffs 2n with payoffs given by the inverse function, u-1(2n).  
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enhanced designs (Cox, et al. 2009; Neugebauer 2010) have used real money payoffs and finite 
versions of the St. Petersburg game. Data from these experiments are inconsistent with risk-
neutrality but consistent with risk-aversion for moderate n (>5) providing support for Bernoulli’s 
general conclusion about risk-aversion (though not about a log specification) as the source of low 
willingness to pay for playing the game.  
The present paper reports on two experiments that implement a modification of the St. 
Petersburg lotteries used in Cox, et al. (2009), replacing positive prizes with negative ones. In 
Experiment 1, prizes in the St. Petersburg lotteries are -2n where n is the number of coin tosses it 
takes to (first) turn up a head, which determines how much subjects get paid to play the game. That 
means, instead of offering subjects an opportunity to pay money for participating in a St. Petersburg 
game with positive prizes, this experiment provides subjects with an opportunity to receive money 
payment for accepting an offer to participate in a St. Petersburg game in which they can only lose 
money. Because this sign-mirror version of the St. Petersburg game offers stochastic losses, people 
may make different decisions depending on whether they are risk-loving or risk-averse over losses, a 
topic on which there is mixed evidence (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Holt and Laury 2002, 
2005; Åstebro, et al. 2015). Previous research suggests that individuals tend to be risk-seeking when it 
comes to gambling involving the possibility to avert financial losses (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 
1984; Scholer, et al. 2010; Rieger, et al. 2015). Furthermore, if St. Petersburg play follows from 
sufficiently small probabilities being regarded as zero (Brito 1975) then we should expect larger 
willingness to play the game with negative prizes than with positive prizes.  
For both the original version of the (finite) St. Petersburg lotteries taken from Cox, et al. (2009) 
and the lotteries developed for this study, participants decide about tradeoffs between possible 
monetary gains and losses. In the n=3 version of the game, a subject who decides to participate pays 
€2.75 for sure and receives €2 (in the case the coin lands Head the first time), €4 in the event TH 
(that is the first land is Tail and the second one is Head), €8 in the event TTH and €0 otherwise 
(that is, the event TTT). The expected value of participating in the n=3 version of the finite St. 
Petersburg game is €0.25.  
In total, 80% of the subjects decided to pay €2.75 to participate in the game (Cox, et al. 2009). In 
the n=3 version of the sign-mirror St. Petersburg game, the game of interest in this paper, a subject 
who decides to participate gets paid €3 for sure but pays back €2 in the event H, €4 in the event TH, 
€8 in the event TTH, and €0 in the case of event TTT. (see Table 1 for n=4 and n=9). The 
expected value of participating in the n=3 sign-mirror version of the finite St. Petersburg game is €0. It 
is not clear how people will play this game in that the game participation is ex ante mixed (total 
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payoff, which is prize plus payment for playing, can be positive or negative depending on the 
resolution of the risk), whereas the prizes that the game offers are all negative. Risk aversion, by 
definition, implies rejection of the St. Petersburg game with negative prizes, Sn for all n as the 
expected value of participation is zero. Furthermore, with expected utility, risk aversion implies that 
the likelihood of rejecting St. Petersburg game increases with n.2 This is consistent with the pattern 
observed in Cox et al. 2009 (but also in data from the new experiments reported in this paper). On the 
other hand, with loss aversion3 acceptance of participation in the conventional St. Petersburg game 
implies rejection of its sign-mirror St. Petersburg game.  
Because the (prize plus participation payment) domain of participation in a St. Petersburg game 
(with positive or negative prizes) is mixed, we conducted another experiment (Experiment 2), reported 
later in the paper, with same lotteries as in Experiment 1, but with the difference that negative 
money prizes are replaced by waiting times. Additionally, in another control treatment we elicited 
subjects’ preferences for waiting times using Holt and Laury’s (2005) procedure. Our subjects’ 
choices revealed risk-seeking attitudes when choosing waiting times in the control treatment, which 
implies that our subjects accept the negative St. Petersburg games (as the expected value of 
participation and nonparticipation is 0). In Experiment 2, we also observe decisions on participation in 
St. Petersburg lotteries constructed from the domain of waiting times used in the control treatment.  
Data from the experiments reported in this paper show that decisions on participating in St. 
Petersburg games are invariant to the sign of prizes. If risk attitudes over negative payoffs are risk-
seeking (a common finding in the literature as well as in our risk elicitation control treatment in 
Experiment 2) then data from experiments in this paper, challenges stability of risk attitudes over 
negative prizes. Thus, the present research re-emphasizes a fruitful field of future inquiry on risk 
attitudes in negative domains of payoffs.  
3 Experiment 1 – The St. Petersburg Game with Monetary Payments 
3.1 Experimental Design and Procedure 
Fifteen students from a major German university from different fields of study participated in the 
experiment. Subjects were invited by email and were informed that the experiment would spread over 
two weeks and that real losses could result from participation, but the losses could be avoided by 
                                                 
2 It is straightforward (available upon request), though tedious, to show that for all n in our experiment, participation in Sn 
is a mean-preserving spread of participation in Sn-1. Figure A1 in the Appendix provides a visualization for the case of St. 
Petersburg games with n=3 and n=4.  
3 See the appendix for a proof when the functional is linear in probabilities. 
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individuals’ decisions. Subjects were also informed that, in the event that a participant realized a loss, 
she would have to pay it from her own money.  
During the first meeting, the participants received a show-up fee of €10. The information from the 
invitation was read aloud to the subjects and, subsequently, the participants filled out a form stating they 
were fully aware of the information provided by the experimenter and they agreed to pay any losses that 
might occur from participation in the experiment.  
The actual experiment on decisions about St. Petersburg lotteries was performed during the 
second meeting, two weeks later, which minimizes the possibility of introducing a bias resulting from 
house-money effects (e.g., Rosenboim and Shavit 2012; Thaler and Johnson 1990). The experiment 
consisted of the same lotteries used in Cox, et al. (2009) with the only difference being that all 
payoffs were multiplied by the factor -1 (i.e., a sign-mirrored version of a finite St. Petersburg 
original game). For a total of 9 lotteries, the participants could choose between participating in the 
lottery or not (see Table 1 for n=4 and n=9). The lotteries varied in the maximum number of coin 
tosses, n with n = 1, 2,…,9. After the participants made their decisions for all of the 9 lotteries, for 
each participant one lottery was randomly chosen for realization. 
A subject choosing to participate in a lottery, Sn with maximum of n tosses received n euros. 
Then a coin was tossed until either a head occurred or the maximum number (n) of tosses for that 
lottery was reached. If the coin turned up heads on the ith ( i<n )  toss, the participant was required 
to pay €2i. 
If the coin did not turn up heads on any of the n tosses, the participant was not required to pay 
anything and her payoff remained at n euros. Thus, potential payoffs from the game participation are 
n, n-2, n-4, .., n-2n with probabilities ½n, ½, ¼, …, ½n. In case of a rejection, the subject receives no 
payment. The expected value of the St. Petersburg game, Sn is -n, and therefore the expected value 
of participation is 0. Risk-seeking individuals would prefer participation whereas risk-averse 
individuals would reject it.4  
Table 1 St. Petersburg lotteries for monetary losses (for n=4 and n=9 games) 
Head occurs the 
first time at toss 
no.: 
Event 
probability 
Payment 
from 
lotteries 
[€] 
Total payoff 
including 
participation fee 
[€] 
Total 
payoff in 
case of 
rejection [€] 
n = 4 
                                                 
4 For illustration purposes, in the appendix Table A1, we provide valuations of game participation for the special case of S-
shaped utility of outcomes with power 0.5. For this example, the utility of participation decreases in n for positive St. 
Petersburg game but increases in n for negative St. Petersburg game. Therefore, we expect opposite patterns of likelihood 
of rejections: increasing for positive prizes but decreasing for negative prizes. 
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not at all 0.0625 0 4 0 
1 0.5 -2 2 0 
2 0.25 -4 0 0 
3 0.125 -8 -4 0 
4 0.0625 -16 -12 0 
n = 9 
not at all 0.0019531 0 9 0 
1 0.5 -2 7 0 
2 0.25 -4 5 0 
3 0.125 -8 1 0 
4 0.0625 -16 -7 0 
5 0.03125 -32 -23 0 
6 0.015625 -64 -55 0 
7 0.0078125 -128 -119 0 
8 0.0039062 -256 -247 0 
9 0.0019531 -512 -503 0 
3.2 Results of Experiment 1 
The analysis of the data from our version of the St. Petersburg lotteries is adapted from the procedures 
used in Cox, et al. (2009) in order to make comparisons. The analysis focuses on the proportion of 
subjects rejecting the St. Petersburg lottery for the maximum number of coin tosses, n. For the 
original form of the St. Petersburg lotteries involving positive prizes, researchers (Cox, et al. 2009; 
Neugebauer 2010) found that the proportion of subjects rejecting a lottery increased with increasing 
numbers of maximum tosses of the coin, which is consistent with risk aversion because increasing n 
increases the spread of payoffs while preserving the mean. We see the same pattern in the sign-mirror 
version of St. Petersburg game with negative prizes. Figure 1 shows choices for positive prizes (light 
grey bars) and negative prizes (dark grey bars). While the proportion of subjects rejecting the lotteries 
is higher on average with negative prizes, the pattern of increasing rejections appears in both games. 
Therefore, there is a pattern to be found when subjects make decisions about St. Petersburg lotteries 
that is robust to whether monetary prizes are positive or negative. Specifically, a significant 
correlation between the n and the number of subjects rejecting to play (rSpearman=.983, p<.001) supports 
the notion of increasing rejection. Likewise, across n, the Pearson correlation between the rates of 
rejection reported in Cox, et al. (2009) and Experiment 1 approaches 1 (rPearson=.941, p<.001). 
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Additionally, whereas risk-seeking behavior suggests an increasing willingness to play with increasing 
n, we were not able to observe this tendency for any of the individuals (p<.001 in a binomial test). 
With S-shaped utility and loss aversion, acceptance of positive St. Petersburg game implies rejection 
of negative St. Petersburg game (see Appendix). This is rejected by data from games with 1, 2 and 3 
tosses. Acceptance rates in the positive St. Petersburg game are [0.87, 0.87, 0.8]; rejection rates in the 
negative St. Petersburg game are predicted to be larger but we observe [0.4, 0.47, 0.67]. 
 
Fig. 1 Comparison of choices for positive or negative money prizes 
3.3 Discussion of Experiment 1 
The experiment’s results highlight that St. Petersburg game play is invariant to gain vs. loss framing of 
lotteries. Experiment 1, however, involves two limitations. First, literature proposes that subjects 
sometimes might have a hard time believing that potential financial losses realized in experiments 
become relevant for them (e.g., Thaler and Johnson 1990). Likewise, a special type of subject tends to 
be more prone to participate in experiments with potential monetary losses, creating the possibility of 
a selection bias (Etchart-Vincent and l’Haridon 2011). Both aspects could be problematic for the 
internal validity of findings.5 Second, Experiment 1 drew on extant studies in assuming a risk-seeking 
tendency for gambles on financial losses. Therefore, we did not control whether our subjects’ risk 
attitudes over losses were risk-seeking.  
Experiment 2 addresses the aforementioned issues, while simultaneously operating with a larger 
                                                 
5 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for making this suggestion. 
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sample. This second investigation substitutes waiting times for financial losses, which previously has 
been shown to provide an appropriate way for integration of realized losses in the context of prospect 
theory experiments (e.g., Abdellaoui and Kemel 2014). In addition, a control treatment provides data, 
which reveals that subjects’ are risk-seeking in gambles over waiting times. 
4 Experiment 2 – Waiting Times 
4.1 Experimental Design and Procedure 
The experiment was conducted with 86 students from different fields of study enrolled at the same 
major German university as in Experiment 1. The participants were randomly divided into three 
groups, with one eliciting risk preferences for waiting time (Treatment 1, 36 participants), and two 
groups playing St. Petersburg lotteries with different base waiting times (Treatment 2, 25 participants, 
10 minutes and Treatment 3, 25 participants, 45 minutes). All participants received a show-up fee of 
€8 before experiment instructions were handed out in the university’s behavioral economics 
laboratory. Furthermore, it was made clear that there would be no other monetary rewards from 
participation in the experiment other than the consequences described in the experiment instructions. 
Unlike Experiment 1, the second experiment did not draw on two separate appointments because 
subjects are unlikely to integrate a monetary show-up fee with waiting times into one mental account 
(Abdellaoui and Kemel 2014). 
4.1.1 Risk Preference for Waiting Time 
To elicit preferences over waiting time, participants were asked to choose between two lotteries in 
each of 10 pairs of lotteries where “payoffs” were determined as waiting time. After choices were 
made, one choice pair was randomly selected for realization (e.g., Lichters, et al. 2016). In the 
experiment, participants were told that their decisions would determine a waiting time in the 
laboratory. This waiting time started after all decisions were made and the chosen lotteries were 
played out. The participants spent this waiting time in a laboratory cabin without any communication 
devices or books. 
The options were presented in a format similar to the one used in Holt and Laury (2005), 
where option A offered less risk but a higher minimum waiting time (with a waiting time of either 30 
or 40 minutes), and option B offered a higher risk but the chance of a much smaller waiting time (with 
a waiting time of either 5 or 60 minutes). The probability of the favorable outcome was always the 
same in the two options but varied between 0 .1 and 1.0 as shown in Table 2. Therefore, risk 
preferences for waiting time could be elicited for each participant by the row in which option B 
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was chosen over A for the first time. If the switching point was in row 4 or earlier, the choice pattern 
would indicate risk-seeking behavior, if it was in row 5 or later, the choice pattern would show risk-
averse behavior.  
Table 2 Lottery choices determining waiting time 
No. Option A Option B 
Expected value 
of wait time 
difference 
EV(A)-EV(B) 
Risk preferences at 
switch from A to B 
1 {.1, 30, .9, 40} {.1, 5, .9, 60} -15.5 
R
is
k
-s
ee
k
in
g
 
2 {.2, 30, .8, 40} {.2, 5, .8, 60} -11 
3 {.3, 30, .7, 40} {.3, 5, .7, 60} -6.5 
4 {.4, 30, .6, 40} {.4, 5, .6, 60} -2 
5 {.5, 30, .5, 40} {.5, 5, .5, 60} 2.5 
R
is
k
-a
v
er
se
 6 {.6, 30, .4, 40} {.6, 5, .4, 60} 7 
7 {.7, 30, .3, 40} {.7, 5, .3, 60} 11.5 
8 {.8, 30, .2, 40} {.8, 5, .2, 60} 16 
9 {.9, 30, .1, 40} {.9, 5, .1, 60} 20.5 
10 {1.0, 30, 0.0, 40} {1.0, 5, 0.0, 60} 25 
 
 
After the choices were made, the experimenter drew a ball from a bingo cage with balls labeled from 1 
to 10 that determined which decision was selected. Then the outcome from the lottery the participant 
chose for the decision in the corresponding row was realized and the waiting time started. 
4.1.2 St. Petersburg Game 
Participants in these treatments were offered a series of St. Petersburg lotteries. All subjects had a base 
waiting time (Treatment 2, 10 minutes; Treatment 3, 45 minutes) and were offered an opportunity to 
participate in a lottery where this waiting time could be reduced or increased depending on their 
decision and the outcome of the lottery. This lottery was designed analogously to the St. Petersburg 
lottery used in Experiment 1 (and Cox, et al. (2009)). For participation in the lottery, the waiting time 
was first reduced by n minutes and subsequently a coin was tossed until a head occurred, with a 
maximum of n tosses. If head occurred on the ith toss, the waiting time was increased by 2i minutes. 
Each participant was offered 9 lotteries with only one decision being randomly selected for 
implementation, with the lotteries differing by the maximum number of tosses n. Table 3 shows 
potential waiting times for n=9 and base time 10 minutes, here we describe the case for n=3.  
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Suppose decision 3 was randomly selected for implementation. If the subject had chosen not to 
play the game then his waiting time was at the base waiting time of 10 minutes (or 45 minutes in the 
45 minutes base time condition). If the subject had chosen to play the game, then the base waiting 
time was reduced by 3 minutes to 7 (or 42) minutes. Then, a coin was tossed. If it came up heads at 
the first toss (an event with probability ½), the waiting time was increased by 2 minutes to 9 (or 
44) minutes. If it came up heads at the second toss (an event with likelihood ¼), the waiting time 
was increased by 4 minutes to 11 (or 46) minutes. If it came up heads at the third toss, the waiting 
time was increased by 8 minutes to 15 (or 50) minutes. If the coin did not come up heads at any of the 
three tosses, the waiting time remained at 7 (or 42) minutes. 
After the participants made their choices, the experimenter drew a ball from a bingo cage 
containing balls numbered from 1 through 9 to select which game would be realized. Waiting time for 
all participants who chose not to play the selected game was the baseline time. For each participant 
who chose to play the game, the experimenter tossed the coin as described above and determined the 
actual waiting time. All participants spent their waiting time in a laboratory cabin without 
communication devices or other kinds of entertainment possibility. To control for scale and/or 
reference point effect (Farber 2008; Kőszegi and Rabin 2007), we ran two treatments with different 
base waiting times of 10 and 45 minutes. 
 
 
Table 3 St. Petersburg lotteries for waiting time (n=9, base time 10 minutes) 
Head occurs 
the first time 
at toss no.: 
Event 
probability 
St. Petersburg 
prize  
[waiting time in 
minutes] 
Total payoff 
including 
participation 
fee of -9  
[waiting time 
in minutes] 
Total payoff 
for rejecting 
to play 
[waiting time 
in minutes] 
not at all 0.0019531 0 1 10 
1 0.5 2 3 10 
2 0.25 4 5 10 
3 0.125 8 9 10 
4 0.0625 16 17 10 
5 0.03125 32 33 10 
6 0.015625 64 65 10 
7 0.0078125 128 129 10 
8 0.0039062 256 257 10 
9 0.0019531 512 513 10 
Expected 
Value 
 9 10 10 
 11 
 
4.2 Results of Experiment 2 
4.2.1 Risk Preferences for Waiting Time 
As described above, subjects can be classified as risk-seeking or risk-averse for choices on waiting 
time by looking at the first row in which option B is chosen. In Table 2, it can be inferred from the 
differences in expected values that risk-seeking individuals would choose option B for the first time in 
row 4 or earlier, while the switching point from option A to option B would be in row 5 or later for 
risk-averse subjects. Table 4 reports the frequencies for rows in which subjects switched to option B: 
any subject who chooses option A in rows 1 through 3 and chooses option B in rows 4 through 10 is 
noted in column 4, while any subject who chooses option A in rows 1 through 4 and then switches to 
option B is noted in column 5.  
We observe 27 out of 36 subjects (75.00%; 95% C.I. [0.58, 0.88]) who made choices consistent 
with risk-seeking behavior. Therefore, we conclude that the vast majority of subjects exhibit risk-
seeking behavior when making decisions about stochastic waiting time (p=0.002, Binomial-Test). 
 
 
 
Table 4 Risk preference for waiting time 
Risk preference Risk-seeking Risk-averse 
Total 
Row of first 
choice of option B 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8-10 
Frequency (%) 
1 
(2.78) 
1 
(2.78) 
6 
(16.67) 
19 
(52.78) 
4 
(11.11) 
2 
(5.56) 
2 
(5.56) 
1 
(2.78) 
36 
(100) 
 
4.2.2 St. Petersburg Game 
Data from elicitation of risk attitudes over waiting time suggest that the majority of subjects are risk-
seeking and therefore would play all of the offered St. Petersburg lotteries for waiting time. The 
expected value of the offered gambles on waiting times is equal to the base waiting time. Therefore, 
a risk-seeking individual would choose to participate in all offered gambles. Data from the St. 
Petersburg game with waiting times as prizes show that while individuals do participate in the 
gambles for small reductions of the base waiting time, they do not for higher possible reductions of 
the base waiting time. Furthermore, decision patterns are similar to those found in the real-payoff 
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experiment with St. Petersburg lotteries with positive money prizes (Cox, et al. 2009) and to the 
Experiment 1 reported above, with negative money prizes (Figure 2). 
With increasing n, subjects exerted decreasing willingness to play. Within the 10-minutes 
condition (dark grey bars), the correlation between n and the number of subjects rejecting is 
rSpearman=.880, p=.002, whereas the 45-minutes condition (ocher bars) yields an r of 953, p<.001. Like 
in Experiment 1 on monetary losses, both waiting time conditions show a pronounced correlation 
with the results reported by Cox, et al. (2009) on positive monetary prizes (rPearson, 10 minutes=.922, 
p<.001, rPearson, 45 minutes=.937, p<.001). Again, we were hardly able to observe risk-seeking-conform 
behavior at the individual level (increasing willingness to play with increasing n), either in the 10-
minutes condition (3/25, p<.001 in a binomial test) nor in the 45-minutes condition (1/25, p<.001 in a 
binomial test). 
In the treatment with a base waiting time of 10 minutes, 2 of the 25 participants chose to never 
play the game, while the rest mostly started by playing the first game, but switched to answering ‘no’ 
at some n. None of the participants chose to play all offered games. The data from the treatment with a 
base waiting time of 45 minutes yielded similar results. Fewer subjects were willing to play lotteries 
with high reductions of the base waiting time (n7) than observed in the 10-minute treatment. 
However, the difference is not meaningful, as we were not able to identify significant differences 
based on Fisher’s exact tests: pn=7=.609, pn=8=.609, pn=9=1.0. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Comparison of rejecting St. Petersburg lotteries of money risk-averse and time risk-
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seeking subjects 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The St. Petersburg Paradox was initially designed to challenge expected value theory. It inspired the 
idea of using utilities, with decreasing marginal utility of money, rather than monetary payoffs to 
resolve the paradox. From that point on, economists have focused on developing theories of decision 
making under risk that can accommodate risk-averse behavior as initially reported for hypothetical 
experiments with the infinite horizon St. Petersburg lottery. Alternative ways of modeling risk 
aversion have been proposed in the literature (for a review of mathematical model attempts see, Seidl 
2013). Risk-averse behavior can be modeled by nonlinear transformation of: (i) payoffs (Bernoulli 
1954; Pratt 1964; Arrow 1971), (ii) probabilities (Yaari 1987), or (iii) both (Quiggin 1993; Tversky 
and Kahneman 1992). But there are versions of St. Petersburg lotteries that produce paradoxes for all 
of these theories if they are defined on unbounded domains (Cox and Sadiraj 2008). If, instead, the 
domain is bounded, then the paradox disappears. For example, if the largest credible prize offered in 
a St. Petersburg lottery is 35 billion euros, then the expected value of the lottery is about 35 euros 
and it would not be paradoxical if people were unwilling to pay large amounts to play. 
Although the original infinite horizon St. Petersburg game cannot credibly be offered to anyone 
in a real-payoff experiment, finite versions are still of interest for elicitation of risk preferences. 
Real-money experiments with positive prize St. Petersburg lotteries produced data that are inconsistent 
with risk-neutrality but consistent with risk-aversion (Cox and Sadiraj 2009; Neugebauer 2010). 
Data from the first experiment in this paper implement a setting in which subjects are believed to be 
risk-loving. It is interesting to see that St. Petersburg lotteries elicit similar behavior with negative or 
positive monetary prizes. Even more strikingly, our second experiment on the St. Petersburg game, 
with waiting times as prizes, elicits similar patterns of behavior even though most subjects appear to 
be risk seekers in this domain. The payoff domain invariance of behavior in these St. Petersburg games 
provides a challenge for decision theory under risk.  
While the hypothesis of infinity (Brito 1975; Cowen and High 1988), associated with the 
original form of the game, is not directly relevant for our finite St. Petersburg games, the concern on 
whether participants would regard the offer of the original game as credible (Shapley 1977) remains 
valid. Thus, while infinity is not the problem in our games, is it possible to control whether 
participants regarded the offer as genuine?  
If subjects would regard an offer as not credible, it is reasonable to assume that high monetary 
losses or the longer waiting times would not be realized and, therefore, a subject playing the lotteries 
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with relatively large maximum number of coin tosses, n would prefer participation in St. Petersburg 
game with negative prizes. That is not what we observe in the experiment. 
Other papers argue that very small probabilities are regarded as zero (Brito 1975) or that small 
probabilities for high wins result in a high risk for the decision maker (Allais 1952; Weirich 1984) 
with a large payment. While these arguments can explain increasing pattern of rejections for positive 
St. Petersburg game, they fail badly in explaining increasing pattern of rejections of participation that 
we observe in our data from St. Petersburg games with negative prizes. This is so as nullification of 
small probabilities or increasing risk for a risk-seeker (as revealed in Holt-Laury elicitation treatment 
in Experiment 2) make participation in the game with negative prizes more attractive as n increases, so 
we should observe a decreasing pattern of rejections as n increases, the opposite of what we see in our 
data, with monetary payment as well as waiting time. 
In conclusion, it can be noted that various conjectures have been advanced to explain behavior 
with St. Petersburg lotteries. However, with the exception of risk aversion, none of the conjectures can 
explain what is observed in our experiments with decisions for real monetary and waiting time 
outcomes. Nevertheless, while risk aversion can explain behavior in our St. Petersburg game, such risk 
aversion in the waiting time experiments conflicts with risk-seeking attitudes elicited by the Holt-
Laury procedure.  
As our results are both, surprising and relevant to business research, future researchers should 
empirically reevaluate models that have been proposed to explain the behaviour observed in the St. 
Petersburg Paradox relying on experiments involving real economic consequences. Likewise, other 
domains of seemingly irrational decision-making would benefit from experiments drawing on real 
consequences involving losses. For example, in case of violations of rational choice such as context-
dependent choice (Cox, et al. 2014), researchers recently discovered that some choice anomalies 
decrease (e.g., the compromise effect, Lichters, et al. 2015) while others increase (e.g., the attraction 
effect, Lichters, et al. 2017) in magnitude with the introduction of economic consequences instead of 
mere hypothetical choices. 
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Appendix. St. Petersburg game and loss aversion 
Let the utility over outcomes be given as 
 
v(x) =
u(x), x > 0
0, x = 0
-lu(-x), x < 0
ì
í
ï
î
ï
ü
ý
ï
þ
ï
 
where  l ³1. For the purpose of this paper we assume the functional is linear in probabilities. 
 
Result 1: If  l ³1 then for all finite n acceptance of participation in one game implies rejection in its sign-
mirror game.  
Proof. Let Sn and Pn denote participation in the finite St. Petersburg game with negative and positive 
prizes that offer up to n coin flips. The value of participating in the n-finite version of the St. Petersburg 
game, Pn with positive prizes is 
 
V (P
n
) =
1
2i
u
i=1..n
å (2i - n)+
1
2n
u(-n)
=
1
2i
u(2i - n)
i>ln n/ln2
n
å - l
1
2 j
u
j<lnn/ln2
å (n- 2 j )+
1
2n
u(n)
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
 
whereas the value of participating in n-finite version of the St. Petersburg game, Sn with negative prizes 
is
 
 
V (S
n
) =
1
2i
u
i=1..n
å (n- 2i )+
1
2n
u(n)
= -l
1
2i
u
i>ln n/ln2
å (2i - n)+
1
2 j
u
j<ln n/ln2
å (n- 2 j )+
1
2n
u(n)  
It can be verified that  
 
V (P
n
)+ lV (S
n
) = (1- l 2 )
1
2i
u(2i - n)
i>lnn/ln2
n
å  
For  l ³1, the left hand side of the last equation is non-positive and therefore acceptance of Sn requires 
rejection of Pn; similarly acceptance of Pn requires rejection of Sn. 
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  Fig. A1 S3 second-order stochastic dominant over S4. On the left: cumulative distributions of S3 
(red) and S4 (blue); on the right: 
 
[S
3
(z)-
-4
x
ò S4(z)]dx   
 
 
  Table A1 Illustration of valuations of St. Petersburg games with linearity in probabilities and 
power function of payoffs 
 
u(x) =
1
1- r
x1-r , x > 0
= -
l
1- r
(-x)1-r , x < 0
  
n 
St. Petersburg game with payments -2n St. Petersburg game with payments 2n 
EV 
r=0, l =1 
Diminish. 
sensitivity 
r=0.5, l =1 
Loss 
Aversion 
r=0.5, l =2 
EV 
r=0, l =1 
Diminish. 
sensitivity 
r=0.5, l =1 
Loss Aversion 
r=0.5, l =2 
1 0 0 -1 0.25 0.25 -0.61 
2 0 0 -0.71 0.25 0.59 -0.07 
3 0 0.37 -0.69 0.25 -0.15 -1.43 
4 0 0.73 -0.20 0.25 -0.36 -1.93 
5 0 1.20 0.03 0.25 -1.03 -3.26 
6 0 1.48 0.17 0.25 -1.34 -4.01 
7 0 1.80 0.45 0.25 -1.67 -4.72 
8 0 2.28 1.10 0.25 -2.07 -5.46 
9 0 2.78 1.54 0.25 -2.67 -6.58 
 
